Instead of solving the problems of the majority, the “far right of a special type” — a right that is intimately tied to liberalism — cultivates a politics of anger
By Vijay Prashad
When Dante Alighieri and his guide reach the fifth circle of hell in Inferno’s Canto VII, they come across the River Styx, where people who could not contain their anger in life now wallow and fight each other on the surface of the turbulent, muddy water, and below them lie those who had been sullen in life, their frustrations coming to the surface as bubbles:
And I, who stood intent upon beholding,
Saw people mud-besprent in that lagoon.
All of them naked and with angry look.
They smote each other not alone with hands,
But with the head and with the breast and feet,
Tearing each other piecemeal with their teeth.
Every culture depicts some variation of this characterisation of hell, in which those who have violated rules that are intended to produce a harmonious society suffer an afterlife of punishment. For instance, in the Indian Gangetic plain, centuries before Dante, the unknown authors of the Garuda Purana described the 28 different narakas (hells).
The similarities between Dante’s Inferno and the Garuda Purana can be explained by the common horrors and fears that human beings share: being devoured alive, drowned and mutilated. It is as if the justice available to most people on Earth is insufficient, and so there is hope that a divine justice will eventually deliver a deferred punishment.
In January 2025, Donald Trump — who has cultivated a politics of anger that is not uncommon in our world — will be inaugurated for his second term as the president of the United States. Such a politics of anger is present in many countries, including across Europe — which otherwise sees itself as somehow above the brutal emotions and as a continent of reason.
There is a temptation amongst liberals to characterise this politics of anger as fascism, but this is not accurate. Trump and his political confraternity across the world (from Giorgia Meloni in Italy to Javier Milei in Argentina) do not advertise themselves as fascists, nor do they wear the same emblems or use the same rhetoric.
Though some of their followers brandish swastikas and other fascist symbols, most of them are more careful. They do not wear military uniforms, nor do they call the military out of the barracks to lend them a hand. Their politics is couched in a modern rhetoric of development and trade alongside the promise of jobs and social welfare for nationals. They point their fingers at the neoliberal pact of the old parties of liberalism and conservatism and mock them for their elitism.
They elevate individuals from outside the ranks of the elites as saviours, men and women who they say will finally speak for the discarded precarious workers and the declined middle classes. They speak angrily to differentiate themselves from the old parties of liberalism and conservatism, who speak without emotion about the ghastly social and economic landscape that now exists in much of the world.
This begs the question: are the leaders of this “far right of a special type” — a new kind of right wing that is intimately tied to liberalism — doing anything especially unique? A close look shows that they are merely building upon the foundation laid by the colourless leadership of the old parties of liberalism and conservativism. For example, the old parties already:
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decimated the social fabric through privatisation and deregulation, weakened trade unions through policies of uberisation, and created insecurity and atomisation in society.
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enforced policies that have increased inflation and deflated wages while increasing the wealth of the few through lax tax policies and rising stock markets.
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strengthened the repressive apparatus of the state and tried to stifle dissent, including by targeting those who want to rebuild working-class movements.
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encouraged war and devastation, such as by preventing a peace deal in Ukraine and encouraging the U.S.-Israeli genocide of Palestinians.
Such a politics of anger is already in motion in society, though none of it was created by the far right of a special type. A world of anger is the product of the neoliberal pact of the old parties of liberalism and conservatism.